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PATENT PRICE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ANTITRUST
LAWS: A BALANCE UPSET*
THE legal monopoly created by a patent is in many respects circumscribed
by the antitrust laws.1 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court early sanctioned in
the patent license restrictions which otherwise constituted a per se violation
of the Sherman Act. United States v. General Electric expressly recognized
that a patentee could establish the price at which a licensee would sell goods
he produced under the patent.2 Recently, however, the Court, following a
general policy of more rigorous application of the antitrust laws, has questioned
*Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1956).
1. The patent laws allow a patentee, his heirs and assigns to exclude for a period
of seventeen years all others from making, using or vending the patented invention with-
in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952). The common law grants a patentee the
right to practice under the patent himself, except, of course, where such conduct impinges
upon another's patent monopoly. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works,
261 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1923); Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210
U.S. 405, 423-25 (1908) ; Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Kury, 88 F. Supp. 243, 247 (E.D.N.Y.
1950).
All or any portion of such rights may be transferred. Depending upon the quantum
of rights conveyed, the transfer may be termed an assignment or license. United States
v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926).
An assignment results from the sale of all rights in the patent. Since the right of
assignment stems from the patent statute, it is governed by federal law. 35 U.S.C. § 261
(1952); Jewett v. Atwood Suspender Co., 100 Fed. 647 (C.C. Vt. 1900). A license,
merely a transfer of a limited right to practice the patented disclosure, falls within state
control. L. L. Brown Paper Co. v. Hydroiloid, 32 F. Supp. 857, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1939),
aff'd, 118 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 653 (1941) ; Farmland Irrigation Co.
v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 308 P.2d 732 (1957). For a general discussion of the
distinctions between licensing and assignment, see TOULMIN, HANDBOOK OF PATENTS 425-
35 (2d ed. 1954) (hereinafter cited as TouLmtl). See also United States v. General
Elec. Co., supra; Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891); Kenyon v. Automatic
Instrument Co., 160 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1947).
2. United States v. General Elec. Co., supra note 1. A license under a patent protect-
.ing tungsten light bulb filaments was issued to Westinghouse by General Electric.
General Electric produced 61% of the incandescent lamps on the market, and Westing-
house 16%. United States v. General Elec. Co., 15 F.2d 715, 716 (N.D. Ohio 1925).
Westinghouse was required to follow prices and terms established by General Electric.
The price-fixing term was upheld, as was a system of distribution allegedly designed to
maintain resale prices.
Absent patent protection, such price fixing would constitute a per se violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). See also REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMmITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAVWS 12-24 (1955)
(hereinafter cited as ATr'y GEN. RPki.). To fall within the aegis of the patent law, the
patent supporting the price-fixing license must be "primary" and cover the entire product.
Thus, General Electric was not allowed to continue its former licensing practice through
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the advisability of such price-fixing agreements.3 In a series of decisions, it
has invalidated a number of pricing licenses primarily on the ground that
the agreements resulted from an active conspiracy among the members of an
industry to establish price regimentation. 4 But language in certain of these
using subsidiary patents after the primary patent had expired. United States v. General
Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 815 (D.N.J. 1949).
Generally, a licensee is estopped from challenging the validity of a patent under which
he is licensed. Similar rules hold for assignments. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazel-
tine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 836 (1950) ; Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica
Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 349 (1924) ; Hall Laboratories, Inc. v. National Aluminate
Corp., 224 F.2d 303, 306-07 (3d Cir. 1955). In a suit against his licensor, the licensee may
attack the patent only on such subsidiary issues as the scope and duration of the patent.
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945) (patent expired) ; Westing-
house Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., supra at 351 (scope of patent) ; Casco
Product Corp. v. Sinko Tool & Mfg. Co., 116 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1940) (same). However,
the Supreme Court, moved by the inherent illegality of price agreements generally, has per-
mitted the licensees to contest the validity of patents when the license contains price-fixing
provisions. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (suit for failure to
follow prices); MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947) (contest
countenanced despite promise not to challenge); Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago
Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947) (licensee, seeking declaratory judgment, had
requested the price fixing).
The protection granted by the patent is limited. A single sale is said to exhaust the
patent and invalidate attempts to set maximum or minimum resale prices by license.
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); Bloomer v. Millinger, 68
U.S. (1 Wall.) 340 (1863). But see F. C. Russell Co. v. Consumers Insulation Co., 119
F. Supp. 119, 122 (D.N.J. 1954) (maximum resale price upheld).
Moreover, a process patent, covering a series of steps or procedure to secure a given
result, TOULMIN 38, does not empower the patentee to establish the sale price of the
resulting product, Cummer-Graham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp., 142 F2d 646 (5th
Cir. 1944) ; Barber-Colman Co. v. National Tool Co., 136 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1943) ; Ameri-
can Equipment Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 69 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1934) ; United States
v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 814 (D.N.J. 1949). Contra, Straight Side Basket
Corp. v. Webster Basket Co., 82 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1936).
3. See Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U.
CHI. L. Rav. 567 (1947) ; Sunderland, Changing Legal Concepts in the Antitrust Field, 3
SYRACUSE L. rv. 60, 67-68 (1951).
A "formula" for distinguishing legitimate patent practices from antitrust violations
ostensibly originated in United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). The
patentee may grant a license to make, use and vend articles defined by the specifications
of the patent upon any condition reasonably within the reward which the patentee is
entitled to secure from the patent grant. Id. at 489. Although widely quoted, the "formula"
can be of little help. See, e.g., General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 305
U.S. 124 (1938). The problem is defining just what "conditions" are within the patent
grant, and this definition can only be achieved through a case by case process evaluating
the effects of a particular license practice in light of patent and antitrust policies. See
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1944).
4. United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952) ; United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S.
287 (1948); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 (1950). See also
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
The first Gypsum case came to the Supreme Court from a district court dismissal of
a government complaint alleging conspiracy in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. United
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cases was broader and led lower judicial tribunals as well as commentators
to doubt the patentee's right to price-fix in any context.r
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 53 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1943). Evidence had been
introduced tending to prove that Gypsum, after extensive multilateral negotiations, had
issued patent licenses containing price restrictions to essentially all the manufacturers of
gypsum plasterboard, lath and wallboard sold east of the Rockies. The agreement compre-
hensively governed all phases of the manufacture, distribution and sale of these products,
whether protected by the patents or not. Unanimously reversing and remanding for
trial, the Court found that United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), "gives
no support for a patentee, acting in concert with all members of an industry, to issue
substantially identical licenses to all members of the industry under the terms of
which the industry is completely regimented, the production of competitive un-
patented products suppressed, a class of distributors squeezed out, and prices on unpatented
products stabilized." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400
(1948). The precise holding was that even if each patent license issued was legal, a § 1
offense would follow from a showing that the defendants--constituting all former com-
petitors in an industry-had acted in concert to use patent licenses for organizing the
industry and stabilizing prices. Id. at 401. Proof of collusion would result from a finding
that each of the alleged conspirators signed identical licenses with knowledge that all
other parties had assumed like responsibilities. The sufficiency of such evidence was first
articulated in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939), and
reaffirmed in United States v. Masonite Corp., supra at 275.
Factually, United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., supra, closely paralleled the first Gypsum
case. As a result of multilateral infringement litigation, the parties agreed to assign the
primary patents in question to New Wrinkle, a corporation formed expressly to hold, and
license under, the patents. The price provisions were not to operate until twelve specified
manufacturers joined the arrangement. Ultimately, New Wrinkle licensed over 200
manufacturers, substantially the entire industry. The licensing system rigidly controlled
the price and terms of sale of the products with an elaborate system of "bulletil s."
Relying on the first Gypsum case, and United States v. Line Material Co., supra, the
Court deemed the practices a Sherman Act violation. United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc.,
mspra at 380.
In Line Material, two small fuse manufacturers holding interdependent patents cross-
licensed each other, with the stipulation that one would establish the sale price of products
manufactured under the patent by either and by any other producer taking a license under
the patents. No conspiracy to price-fix the industry was alleged, but the Court found
price fixing by two competitors under a cross-licensing arrangement illegal in itself.
United States v. Line Material Co., supra at 314-15; see note 5 infra.
5. See United States v. Line Material Co., supra note 4, at 315. Farley, Price Fixing
and Royalty Provisions in Patent Licenses, 34 J. PAT. Or. Soc'y 46 (1952) ; Note, 61
HARv. L. Ray. 1427 (1948); Note, 43 ILL. L. Rav. 400 (1948). Contra, Rogers, Price
Control Under Patent Agreements, 12 U. Pirr. L. REV. 569, 586 (1951).
Concurring in Line Material, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for himself and three other
Justices, would have overruled United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
Mr. Justice Reed, writing for the Court, and the three dissenting Justices considered the
case good law. Thus, General Electric was affirmed by an equally divided Court. Mr.
justice Reed sought to distinguish the factual circumstances of Line Material from those
of General Electric and rested the decision of the Court on the illegality of price fixing
pursuant to a cross-licensing agreement. The concurring Justices found nothing more
onerous in such a practice than in price fixing under a single patent and were unable to
distinguish the two situations.
Mutually blocking patents have been considered essentially equivalent to a single
usable patent. So viewed, agreement of the patentees should not of itself constitute a
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This revised attitude is illustrated by the holding of the Third Circuit in
Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co.6 The action originated in a suit
by Newburgh for infringement of its process patent.7 Counterclaiming, Su-
perior charged plaintiff with violation of the antitrust laws by reason of price
restrictions placed in licenses issued under the patent.8 Although only two
members of a five-company industry did not practice under the patent, neither
conspiracy nor intent to regiment the industry was alleged. 9 And while the
court found no conspiracy to exist, it nevertheless held the price-fixing agree-
ment illegal. The later Supreme Court decisions were interpreted to allow
price-fixing terms in one but not a number of patent licenses.10
conspiracy. Thomas, The Patentee's Dilemma-Is Price Fixing Legal?, 4 MIA. tI L.Q.
313, 323-30 (1950). See also Kligler, Recent Judicial Limitation of the Patent License
Contract, 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 685, 687 (1948).
6. 237 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1956).
7. Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 105 F. Supp. 372 (D.N.J. 1952).
The process patent covered a method of finishing textiles. Id. at 373-74.
Intermediate rounds of this complicated affair were fought at 116 F. Supp. 759 (D.N.J.
1953) ; 218 F.2d 580 (3d Cir. 1955) ; 136 F. Supp. 923 (D.N.J. 1955). For further dis-
cussion of this litigation, see 55 MIcE. L. Rv. 726. (1957) ; 105 U. PA. L. REv. 411
(1957) ; 43 VA. L. REv. 101 (1957).
8. Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 105 F. Supp. 372, 376 (D.N.J. 1952).
The licenses in question only established the minimum price to be charged for the patented
process. Id. at 374. No attempt was made to price-fix the goods produced by the patent,
as such conduct had long been held illegal. See note 2 supra.
Equity courts have traditionally withheld their aid if a plaintiff is attempting to pursue
his rights contrary to the public interest. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation 40, Railway
Employees, AFL, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 185
(1935) ; Beasley v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 191 U.S. 492, 497 (1903) ; DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF
MOIDERN EulrY 40-41 (2d ed. 1956). Thus, a patentee who "misuses" his patent by attempt-
ing to expand his monopoly beyond its permissible scope has been unable to obtain what
vould otherwise constitute justifiable relief for infringement-an injunction and an account-
ig. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) ; Morton Salt Co. v. G.
S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). And use of a patent in violation of the antitrust law'
constitutes patent misuse, with all of the resultant consequences to the patentee. Hartford-
Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump
Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952). Of course, violation
of the antitrust laws may also be sufficient ground for a separate suit for treble damages.
26 STAT. 210 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., supra;
Hughes Tool Co. v. Ford, 114 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Okla. 1953), modified, 215 F.2d 924
(10th Cir. 1954). Moreover, use of the patent monopoly in contravention of the antitrust
laws may lead to such drastic penalties as compulsory licensing and divestiture of patents.
United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 ('1947) : United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953): United States v. IBM, 1956 Trade Cas.
01 68245.
9. Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 105 F. Supp. 372, 374 (D.N.J. 1952).
10. 237 F.2d at 292-94.
In Newburgh, the court found difficulty in distinguishing New Wlrinkle from General
Electric. See note 4 supra. Although the firms in New Vrinkle constituted 90% of the
relevant market, the court felt that illegal co-operation was less likely than in General
Electric, where only 76% of the market was controlled. For 200 firms were represented in
the New Wrinkle conspiracy. And the court argued that the licenses would be far more
19581
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This single-licensee interpretation appears technically unwarranted. The
court construed an offhand statement by Mr. Justice Reed in United States
v. Line Material Co.-the case generally recognized as most severely questioning
the right of patent price fixing-that a patentee might legally license "another"
with price restrictions to mean that a patentee might impose such conditions in
"only one" license." But use of the singular "another" does not negate a
broader construction than that assumed by the court; the terms "another" and
"others" are often used interchangeably.' 2 And the context within which the
statement was made would appear to render the court's interpretation mean-
ingless. In the sentence immediately preceding the statement relied upon
by the court, Mr. Justice Reed expressly disclaimed any attempt at establishing
the scope of permissible price-fixing arrangements.' 3 Moreover, in deciding a
case subsequent to Line Material, the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Reed
explicitly reserved as undecided any question relative to the legality of a
number of patent licenses containing price restrictions.1
4
A criterion of legality directed only to the number of licensees seems inde-
fensible except as a convenient judicial means of limiting patent price fixing.
difficult to police than those involved in General Electric, where only two firms co-operated.
However, since General Electric controlled 61% of bulb manufacture itself, vigorous
competition in that industry was unlikely in any event. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPE-
TITION 91, 101, 105, 153-55 (1949). In the New Wrinkle industry, on the other hand,
price fixing jeopardized the competition usually attending the existence of numerous
firms.
11. 333 U.S. 287, 304 (1948) : "In these circumstances [lack of a majority to affirm or
overrule], we must proceed to determine the issues on the assumption that General
Electric continues as precedent. . . . On that assumption where a conspiracy to restrain
trade or an effort to monopolize is not involved, a patentee may license another to make
and vend the patented device with a provision that the licensee's sale price shall be fixed
by the patentee." The Newburgh court, in interpreting this statement to enunciate a single-
licensee doctrine, may have been influenced by the dictum of Mr. justice Douglas in United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). Although that case involved
copyright licenses only, Mr. Justice Douglas, in analogizing to the patent law, seemed
to imply that Line Material had limited General Electric strictly to its facts-only one
license with price limitations could be issued. Id. at 144. For comment on this position,
see Rogers, supra note 5, at 577.
12. State ex rel. Crown Coach Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 238 Mo. App. 287, 297-99,
179 S.W.2d 123, 127 (1944); Eastham v. Holt, 43 W. Va. 599, 604, 27 S.E. 883, 884
(1897) ; see 105 U. PA. L. Ray. 411, 413 (1957).
13. "Furthermore we do not think it wise to undertake to explain, further than
the facts of this case require, our views as to the applicability of patent price limitation
in the various situations listed by the government." 333 U.S. at 304. The government
questioned, inter alia, whether intermediate patents could support price fixing of the final
good, the extent to which the patent must dominate the price-fixed article to allow price
fixing, the legality of price fixing with pooled patents and the marketing restrictions which
could be placed upon licensees. Brief for Appellants, pp. 65-68.
14. "It was not necessary to reach the issue as to whether a mere plurality of licenses,
each containing a price fixing provision, violates the Sherman Act." United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 85 (1950). This second Gypsum case was an




Unquestionably, price-fixing agreements effected through an industry-wide
conspiracy cannot be sustained. Their objective is not exploitation of the
patented product but utilization of the protected monopoly to shield objection-
able conduct.'i The single-licensee doctrine, on the other hand, does not
possess any comparable logic. No consideration is given to the fraction of
the industry controlled by the patentee and licensee and thus to the effect
which such an agreement may have upon prices.16 Justified as denying licensees
rewards which generally may be obtained only through horizontal co-operation,
the single-licensee doctrine provides a lone licensee with just such benefits. 17
15. "The rewards which flow to the patentee and his licensees from the suppression
of the competition through the regulation of an industry are not reasonably and normally
adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's monopoly." United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 401 (1948).
If the members of an industry wish to eliminate price competition, they may all take
price licenses under a patent and at the same time not produce competitive goods. Com-
petition from equivalent goods thus eliminated, price competition is avoided since the
only product sold is price-fixed. Moreover, such agreements would tend to reduce in-
centive to invent new competing products or processes. And the patent used to promote
the scheme may even be of questionable validity. See, e.g., United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278-79 (1942) (del credere agency device to regulate prices and
suppress competition). See also Steffen, Invalid Patents and Price Control, 56 YMt L.J.
1-6 (1946) ; Diggins, The Patent-Antitrust Problem, 53 MICH. L. REv. 1093-95 (1955).
16. See 105 U. PA. L. REv. 411, 414 (1957). Under the single-licensee doctrine, the
test of illegality is based solely upon the number of licensees which practice the patent
under price limitations. Illegality follows whether the multiple licensees, plus the patentee
if he practices the patent, control an insignificant percentage of the relevant market or
dominate it. As a result, price fixing in patents, which traditionally has been more liber-
ally treated than price fixing in the more general economic context, may become more
restricted. While price fixing is generally thought to be per se illegal, only where defend-
ant's acts significantly affect the market as a whole will the conduct be held in violation
of the antitrust laws. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) ;
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 240 (1918). But, of course, the single-
licensee doctrine might be interpreted not to embrace patent pricing agreements with
little or no market effect.
17. Licensing provisions which appear principally designed to benefit the licensee
are judicially disfavored and are usually not granted exemption from the antitrust laws.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 144 (1948) ; Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 230 (1939) ; United States v. Krasnov, 143 F. Supp.
184 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (price fixing) ; United States v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 141 F.
Supp. 118, 127 (N.D. Ill. 1956) (territorial restrictions) ; United States v. Besser Mfg.
Co., 96 F. Supp. 304, 311 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 444 (1952) (veto power
over new licensees) ; United States v. Vehicular Parking Ltd., 54 F. Supp. 828, 838 (D.
Del. 1944) (price fixing by nonproducing licensor). See also Rogers, supra note 5, at
586.
Any benefits which would inure to multiple licensees would accrue equally to the one
licensee under the single-licensee doctrine. For to him, the producing patentee is just
another competitor. And the elimination of price competition between these two parties
results in benefits similar to those resulting from price agreement with any competitor
or competitors. If the patentee does not produce himself, the lone licensee does not, of
course, confront the prospect of competition; he is a monopolist. Arguably, however,
some or all of the excess profits which licensees might obtain through reduced competition
1958]
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Even were the doctrine effective in this regard, patent policy should seek a
balance between benefit to the patentee and harm to the public rather than
focus on incidental reward accruing to third parties.13
Furthermore, any policy directed to the evils underlying licensing price fix-
ing--restriction of licensee competition in patented goods--cannot be fully
implemented by invalidating price-licensing agreements. Territorial limitations
are expressly authorized by the patent statute.' To the extent such factors
as high transportation costs insulate individual territories from one another
and preclude resale of goods among them, these limitations may be as effective
as price fixing. With only a single seller in each area assigned, no competition
between licensees could occur. And if different territories manifest different
demands, the patentee's profits-percentage royalties--could be further enhanced
since his licensees would be able to charge differing prices in each territory."
Even absent such optimum conditions, the patentee could achieve price-fixing
results by imposing quantity controls. 2' Through their effect on supply, these
among each other could be extracted by the patentee in the form of increased royalties.
To the extent profits are in fact extracted, the restrictions may be viewed as benefiting
the patentee rather than the licensee.
Attempts by patentees to set the resale price of products manufactured by licensees
under the patent present a similar situation and are universally held illegal. Ethyl Gasoline
Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 452-53 (1940); Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell,
229 U.S. 1 (1913).
18. WCOD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAw 21 (1942). See also note 3 supra; note 3f)
infra. Hollabaugh, Patents and Antitrust Laws, 25 U. CIN. L. Rxv. 43, 45-46 (1956).
19. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1952) : "The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal repre-
sentatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his application
for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States." This
grant has been construed as permitting territorial restrictions in patent licenses. Brownell
v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1954). A patentee may similarly
preclude his licensee from the export market. Ibid. But patents may not be used as the
basis of international market-sharing agreements. United States v. General Elec. Co.,
82 F. Supp. 753, 827-48 (D.N.J. 1949) ; cf. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United State.,
341 U.S. 593 (1951) (attempted use of trademark to allocate international market).
20. A producer will maximize profits by setting price or output at that level where
the extra income derived from the last sale is equal to the cost of producing that last
unit. The extra income and cost of the last 'units are termed marginal revenue and
marginal cost, respectively. Marginal cost usually varies with output, reflecting the
different per unit costs of producing at each separate level of output. Marginal revenue
is constant only in pure competition, and then it is always equal to price. In other market
structures (monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition), marginal revenue decreases
with increasing sales and is below price. SAmUELsON, EcoN;o-mics 447-50 (3d ed. 1955).
If demand conditions differ in two markets, the producer is faced with two different
demand curves, and he will maximize profit by setting separate prices so that marginal
cost is equal to marginal revenue in each market. In essence, he charges consumers with
intensive demand for the product more than buyers with weaker desires for the good.
This practice will only be feasible if the weak demand group cannot resell to those with
the stronger demand, who are paying higher prices. BOULDING, EcoxomIc AxZALYsis
609-15 (3d ed. 1955).
21. Although no direct ruling has been made, quantity limitations in patent licenses
have been endorsed by dicta. Extractol Process, Ltd. v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 153 F.2d
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controls are virtually identical to price restrictions. 22 Not protected by statute,
they would have to fall with price licensing.
Denial of power over price or quantity would, however, exaggerate the dis-
advantage of those patentees who are incapable of producing the optimum
volume of the patented product. An owner developing his patent entirely by
self-production could realize full monopoly profits. 23 In contrast, the patentee
required to commercialize by licensing others to manufacture and sell the
patented good would not obtain full monopoly return.2 4  With incomplete
control over total production and with numerous licensees each seeking to
maximize his own profits, the optimum price and output level of the industry
as a whole, and thus of the patentee himself, may never be achieved.2 This
264, 266 (7th Cir. 1946) ; American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 69 F.2d
406, 408 (7th Cir. 1934) ; Avr'Y GEN. REP. 236. The scarcity of cases suggests that this
method of price control is unpopular with patentees and licensees. Possibly, licensees feel
that quantity controls are overly restrictive since they render nonprice competitive
methods, such as advertising and service, useless to achieve a greater share of the market
than that originally contemplated. See CHAMBERLIN, THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC CoMPErI-
TION 71-72 (7th ed. 1956).
22. The output of any product and the price that output will command are inter-
related. Setting either variable will determine the other; thus control over volume
will enable price fixing. SAMUELSON, EcONOmICs 367-68 (3d ed. 1955).
Moreover, quantity controls may be easier to police than price restrictions and hence
be more efficient. Most price-control systems run the risk of partial subversion by secret
rebates, overly generous quantity discounts or superior credit terms. These are difficult
to curb without elaborate detection systems. For examples of systems devised to prevent
price cutting, see United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 375 & n.4 (1952) ;
Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 579-83 (1936) ; FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 447-51 (1922). However, quantity restrictions, especially if
combined with per unit royalty payments, would be far simpler to police. Under per
unit royalty agreements, the patentee is generally permitted access to the licensee's pro-
duction records to compute the royalty due. Any attempt at concealing evidence of the
volume actually produced would not only be difficult, but would entail fraud since the
patentee would be deprived of his rightful royalty payments. See ST. CLAIR, DRAFTING
RoYAL'T'-BEARING LICENSES 15 (1951).
23. A patentee producing alone naturally has full power over the price or, identically,
the output of his product. See note 25 infra.
24. By licensing, the patentee creates new centqrs of output and price decision and
no longer has unilateral control of the market. Some power is retained by his ability
to affect the licensee's costs through royalty charges. See ATr'y GEN. REP. 235-36
(dissent of Louis B. Schwartz) ; Farley, supra note 5, at 58. See also note 25 infra.
25. Optimum production level refers to the output which, if produced at the highest
possible efficiency, will yield the greatest profits. See BouLDING, EcoNomic ANALYSIS
563-73 (3d ed. 1955). If the patentee boasts this capacity and efficiency, he can himself
produce the requisite output. If not, he must divide production with licensees if he wishes
the optimum output level to be reached. Ibid.; cf. Patinkin, Firms. Cartels and Iinperfect
Competition, 61 Q.J. EcoN. 173, 174-85 (1947). However, as soon as independent sources
of decision in the form of licensees are created, problems of inducing the optimum price
and production level arise. See note 34 in ra.
The possession of a final-consumer-good patent confers some quantum of monopoly
power by the patentee's freedom to adjust price without losing all his customers. The
extent of his price range in turn depends upon how willing consumers are to substitute
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disability of the nonproducing patentee is compounded by an impaired bargain-
ing position; unable to exploit his monopoly individually, he may have diffi-
culty in inducing potential licensees to meet his demands for full monopoly
royalties.
2 6
other goods for his product when faced with price increases. See ST. CLAm, op. Cit. supra
note 22, at 11. These considerations apply to any monopoly. BowMtAN & BACH, Eco-
Nomic ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY 160-63, 283-86 (1946); ENKE, INTERMEDIATE
ECONOMIC THEORY 295-96 (1950). Thus, the final-good patentee must behave like a
monopolist to capitalize his invention, and price and output must be set so that marginal
revenue equals marginal cost. BAIN, PRICING, DISTRIBUTION, AND EmPLOYMENT 140-47
(1948).
If the patentee is the only producer, he will, of course, himself set the optimum price. If
the patentee licenses, the optimum price and total output will be similarly computed so
that total industry monopoly profits can be maximized. The proportion of total monopoly
profits obtained by the patentee depends upon the extent to which he is successful in ex-
tracting, by royalties, those excess profits attributable to the patent. See PErEsoN, Eco-
NOMICs 522-24 (1949). The exact amount depends upon factors discussed in note 26 infra.
The patentee's problem is how to induce each licensee to produce at the output at
which total industry production and price will be at the maximizing point. If the licensees
are sufficiently numerous to act like competitors, the patentee can induce the optimum
price and output by manipulating royalty charges. Generally, in the competitive case,
both the individual producer's and the industry's price and output can be determined if
the total demand and the individual cost curves of the members are known. Marginal
revenue is seen as equal to price, and each licensee assumes his output will have no effect
on the final price. Thus, he merely adjusts output so that marginal cost equals marginal
revenue. CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 16-20; BAN, op. cit. supra at 141. The
patentee, however, has control over each licensee's marginal costs through his ability
to vary royalty charges. If he knows each licensee's other costs and chooses the proper
number of licensees, he can set the royalty so that the industry price will be optimum and
each licensee will produce just that output which makes total production optimum. In
effect, the patentee influences the licensee's marginal cost curve to intersect his marginal
revenue curve at the desired point. See SAMUELSON, ECONoMICs 447-50 (3d ed. 1955).
However, if there is more than one producer, but less than enough to create "pure"
or "perfect" competition, each licensee knows his production affects price but cannot be
sure of his rival's reactions to any of his moves. The predicted price and output depend
upon assumptions concerning each seller's view of his direct and indirect effect on the
market, whether sellers change price or output, and the uncertainty of each seller about
his competitors' plans. As a result, the price to be achieved can at no time be specified
with certainty and might be monopoly price, competitive price, a price intermediate be-
tween the two or even an oscillating price. CHAMBERLIN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 30-55.
See also FELLNER, CO.MPETITION AMONG THE Faw 25-41, 93-97 (1949). In such a situation,
the patentee does not know each licensee's demand curve and thus cannot ascertain the
effect of setting various royalties. Therefore, he cannot induce each licensee to produce
at the price and output he wishes, and optimum price and output may not be reached.
But if the patentee has control over the price or production level of his licensees, the fact
that he does not know their individual demand curves is of no moment. All he must
know is the industry demand and individual cost curves, the same data he would need if
attempting to maximize solely by manipulating royalties. He will then allocate production
over his licensees so that optimum output will be reached and industry profits maximized.
The patentee has the opportunity of extracting all the monopoly profits through royalties.
See Patinkin, supra at 174-85.
26. Ability to self-produce is one of many factors which make up bargaining strength.
See ST. CLAIR, op. cit. supra note 22, at 11-18 (exhaustive discussion of the formulation
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Moreover, if quantity and price-licensing privileges were eliminated, the
owner of an intermediate patent would enjoy a better position than the final -
patentee. Broadly classified, patents fall into two general categories. A final
patent protects products which themselves satisfy consumer demand.2 7 An
intermediate patent may be defined as encompassing products and processes
which directly or indirectly contribute to the formation of a final good; inter-
mediate patents are useful only in so far as the patented product or process per-
forms more efficiently the role of an existing good.28 While full exploitation
of a final patent requires complete control of the product's price or quantity-
monopoly reward is gained when price and total volume are at that level where
marginal cost equals marginal revenue- 29 such dominion is not always essen-
tial in an intermediate patent.30 Volume is necessarily limited by the demand for
the final product.3 ' And the ideal price of the intermediate patent is generally
of royalties). Other factors include the relative resources of the parties, the alternatives
open to them, the number of potential licensees, knowledge of the markets and the skill
of each individual as a bargainer. Cf. DUNLOP, WAGE DErERmiNAToN UNDER TRAoE
UNIONS 74-78, 91-92 (1944) ; Slichter, The Determinants of Bargaining Power, in COL-
LEcnVE BARGAINING CONTRAcrs 46-48 (1941).
27. The final patent has been defined to encompass new consumption goods which are
purchased to satisfy consumer wants. Examples include home furnishings, clothing, food and
entertainment. BOULDING, EcoN oMIc ANALYSIS 6,0-81 (3d ed. 1955).
28. Intermediate patents are of two general types. One includes goods or processes
which are not produced for their own sake, but help further production of a final con-
sumption good as defined in note 27 supra. Examples include cloth, steel ingots, tool dies
and material moving machinery. The other embraces new ways of producing an existinj
final good. Glass blowing devices and the finishing process involved in the Newburgh
case are examples of this rather narrow category. Classification of some goods, and
thus the patent on them, depends on the specific use to which they are put. Thus, auto-
mobiles used by consumers would be final goods, but the same automobile employed as
part of a business would be an intermediate good. See SAMUELSON, EcoNoMIcs 190
(3d ed. 1955).
Intermediate patents fulfill a commercial need only if the existing service is impractical
because of a scarcity of resources, unobtainable because of limitations through patents or
otherwise less efficient. See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386,
392-401 (1945) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931). Such patents, even
though not significantly more efficient than an existing good or process, may be a con-
venient vehicle for price regimentation of an industry. See note 15 supra. Such use of a
patent is, of course, illegal.
29. See note 25 supra.
30. Intermediate patents are valuable because of the cost savings their use entails.
The patentee will allow others to use his product, and thus effect savings, only if part of
these savings are paid to him in royalties. The upper limit to royalty payments is the
total savings the patent permits over the best available substitute. ST. CLAIR, op. cit.
supra note 22, at 11-12. The exact royalty will depend on the parties' relative bargaining
strengths. See note 26 supra.
31. Ultimately, all demand stems from the consumer. The direct effect of consumer
demand on final goods moves suppliers to purchase those intermediate factors necessary
to produce them. Thus, the demand for intermediate products will usually remain un-
changed so long as demand for the relevant final good is constant. As a result, a producer
who furnishes the entire supply of an intermediate good would have no reason to cut
price, since he could not increase sales at the lower price. Similarly, the owner of an
1958]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
that which will just persuade purchasers to replace the existing service with
the patented innovation.3 2 Thus, licensees are less likely to engage in price
competition for the fixed market protected by the intermediate patent than
they are in the final market where demand is not predetermined.3 3 The inter-
mediate patentee accordingly tends to suffer less from denial of price or quantity
controls than does the owner of a final patent.34
intermediate patent has no reason to set the price of his patented service lower than that
necessary to induce customers to stop using the old good and switch to his newer,
cheaper substitute. Actually, the market for intermediate products operates similarly
to that of labor, since both are necessary to the production of any final good. BoW3IAN
& BACH, op. cit. supra note 25, at 239-43; BOULDING, ECONOmiC ANALYSIS 204-07 (3d ed.
1955). If an intermediate good represents a large part of the total cost of the final
product, and if the industry is highly competitive, with free entry and flexible prices, a
reduction in the price of the intermediate good may so lower the price of the final good
as to lead to an increase in its demand, and thus the demand for the intermediate patent.
In that case, it could be beneficial for the intermediate patentee to set his price below
that previously prevailing if demand for the final good is elastic and if a reduction in
price will create enough new demand to increase total profits. Ibid.
32. See note 31 supra.
33. Generally, the smaller the patent profits bargained for by the licensee, the more
likely will price competition be to reduce price below licensee cost and the more unlikely
will the prospect of price competition become. See EDwARDs, MAINTAINING COMPETITION
101 (1949) ; 105 U. PA. L. R. v. 411, 414 (1957) ; notes 25, 26, 30 supra. The relative efficien-
cies of the parties producing the patent may also affect the possibility of price competition.
If one party is more efficient than the others, the likelihood of price competition is en-
lianced, since such producer has a lower cost and a larger margin of profit in which to
function before price becomes less than cost. ATT'Y GEN. REP. 235-36 (dissent of Louis B.
Schwartz). On price competition generally, see BACKMAN, PRICE PRAcrICES AND PRICE
PoLIcIEs 119-48, 378-417 (1953) ; MACHLUP, ECONOMICs OF SE.LERs' ComrUPTmON (1952).
34. The patentee may obtain return both from royalties charged licensees and self-
production. Although total demand for the patented intermediate product may be fixed,
each licensee might be tempted to cut price to obtain some of the market of his com-
petitors, both the patentee and other licensees. See note 31 supra. In the event of price
cutting, the exact effect upon a self-producing patentee's profits will depend upon the
royalty he extracts from licensees and the ease with which he can abandon production.
If the royalty is a fixed percentage of selling price, price competition will reduce patentee
profits accordingly. Moreover, if the patentee is himself practicing the patented dis-
closure, any price cut will impinge upon the entrepreneurial and patent profits obtained
from his own sales. Since the demand for an intermediate good is largely insensitive to
price, the cut will not proportionately increase sales, and thus profits. And, since all com-
petitors will generally meet the price cut, no individual increase in production is likely
to accompany the decreased price.
If the royalty is substantially equal to the full monopoly value of the patent and not
dependent upon price, and if the patentee can easily reduce or stop production, he would
be best off halting production and allowing his licensees to take over his share of the
market. During price competition, on every sale he himself makes he loses the difference
between optimum price and actual sale price. If the same good were sold by a licensee, no
such loss would result, since the royalty is independent of price. However, if royalties
are low compared with the value of the patent, and the patentee obtains proportionately
more from his own use or sales than from licensee royalties, he cannot afford to lose any
business; the increased number of royalties will not compensate him for the lost profits
on the sales relinquished.
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A patent policy which heightens the value of self-production and discrimi-
nates against final patentees seems unjustifiable. The patent monopoly has tra-
ditionally been viewed as a reward for invention alone, not invention plus sub-
sequent exploitation.35 Not only does a policy encouraging exclusive self-
production so depart from the aims of patent law, it contravenes values inherent
in antitrust legislation.36 Initially, widespread licensing assures the existence
35. Invention and subsequent disclosure of the patented discovery has long been the
primary objective of the patent law. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag
Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) ; Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241-42 (1832) ;
TOULlIN 4; Mitman, Economic Aspects of Inventions and Legal Monopolies, 26 Miss.
L.J. 149, 152-54 (1955). The form and source of exploitation has been considered a
problem unrelated to the patent grant. For patentees may even suppress the patent for
the period of their temporary monopoly with no resultant loss of patent privileges. Special
Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378-79 (1945); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
States, 323 U.S. 386, 433 (1945) ; Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works,
261 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1923). For discussion severely criticizing this position, see Special
Equipment Co. v. Coe, stepra at 380 (dissenting opinion) ; EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COM-
PETiTIoN 238-42 (1949) ; Castle, Recent Trends in Compulsory Licensing in Case of Non-
use of Patents: A Comparative Analysis, 36 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 330 (1954) ; Feuer, The
Patent Privilege and the TNEC Proposals, 14 T-msi. L.Q. 180, 190-94 (1940). But see
Davis, Putting Patents to Work, 36 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 713 (1954). And the constitu-
tional grant authorizing Congress to establish a patent system does not contemplate
the source of exploitation: "The Congress shall have power ... to promote the progress
of science by securing for limited time to . . . inventors the exclusive rights to their
respective... discoveries." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Brown, The Constitutional Pur-
pose, 31 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 643 (1949).
36. The courts have traditionally distinguished the loose-knit combination-union
of competitors by agreement without any property link-from the single trader. See,
e.g., American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 418 (1921) (dis-
senting opinion). If a number of independent firms attempt to accomplish by agreement
price control, territorial division, group boycott or resale price maintenance, a Sherman
Act violation may very well result. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952); see
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price control by pro-
ducers of over 50% of the market held illegal) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U.S. 392 (1927) (price control by producers of over 82% of the market held illegal) ;
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899) (territorial division by producers of 60% of the relevant market held illegal) ;
Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycott by manu-
facturers producing 38% of dresses selling at $6.75 and up and 60% of dresses selling at
$10.95 and up held illegal). For a detailed discussion of the characteristics and judicial
treatment of loose-knit combinations, see Hale, Agreements Among Competitors: Incidental
and Reasonable Restraints of Trade, 33 Mlfix. L. Rav. 331 (1949). However, one firm
with an equally large percentage of the market, may create ,the same conditions which
the independent firms were attempting to promote, merely by setting a price, refusing
to deal with a particular purchaser or building a retail outlet for its produce. United
States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F2d 416, 427-28 (2d Cir. 1945); Note, 66 YArx L.J. 1251,
1252-53 (1957). And, generally, the minimum market power necessary to effect these results
is held not violative of the Sherman Act. Id. at 1253 n.6. See also United States v. E. I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). Only when the firm controls the ex-
tremely high percentage of the market necessary to meet the monopolization requirements
of § 2 of the Sherman Act, or engages in a conspiracy to monopolize trade, will a violation
be found. See United States v. Aluminum Co., supra (monopoly power) ; United States
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of firms with sufficient facilities, know-how and market penetration to allow
competition upon expiration of the patent or to facilitate generalized pro-
duction in an emergency.37 Further, it fosters the recognized policy of aiding
small competitors: 38 patentees with neither the facilities nor the credit to
produce the patented product independently may exploit by licensing. Finally,
more perfect allocation of resources results as the inefficient producer is en-
couraged to allow efficient firms to commercialize the patent rather than to
prefer self-production, even at less than optimum volume, to licensing with-
out restrictions. 89
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953) (attempt to gain and keep
control of an extremely large portion of an industry). For an analysis tracing the growth
of the dichotomy between the loose-knit and close-knit combination, see Note, 66 YALE
L.J. 1251, 1254-56 (1957).
The cause of such divergent treatment would not appear to be judicial sympathy for
the large corporation. In part, it results from a feeling that it would be "unfair" to attack
a corporation which has grown large exclusively by legal means: "A single producer
may be the survivor of a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior
skill, foresight, and industry. In such cases a strong argument can be made that, although
the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the act does not mean to con-
demn the resultant of these very forces which it is its prime object to foster .... The
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when
he wins." United States v. Aluminum Co., supra at 430. However, the liberal treatment
is primarily due to the fear of dissolving these large economic concentrations because
of the uncertainty of the effect which dissolution would have upon the economy. See,
e.g., Jones, The Problems of Size in Antitrust Thinking: Theories in Search of Facts,
3 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 141 (1956). Finally, while agreements between competitors are gen-
erally directed toward anticompetitive goals, advantages of scale may inhere in the large
firm. Thus, with enhanced efficiency, a stabilizing effect upon the economy and resources
to advance technology, the close-knit combination may be a socially useful institution. See
MACHLUTP, THE PoLiTIcAL EcoNo.My OF MONOPOLY c. 3 (1950).
No comparable arguments may be found to favor exclusive self-production by the
patentee. No problems as to dissolution and the resulting economic effect exist. And
even should efficiency result from concentrated production, the public need derive no benefit
from the patentee's monopoly position. Moreover, strong arguments favor widespread
licensing. See notes 37-39 infra and accompanying text.
37. Compulsory licensing is often recommended as an antidote to the evils of the
patent system. EDwARDs, MAINTAINING CoMPETITION 242-43 (1949). The Attorney Gen-
eral's Committee suggested it as one of the chief remedies for patent abuse. ATr'y Gm.
REP. 255-59. A minority even thought that royalty-free compulsory licenses were author-
ized by the antitrust laws. Ibid. Compulsory licenses were used as corrective measures in
United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) ; Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
States, 323 U.S. 386 (1944) ; United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., supra note 36.
38. See United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Loevinger,
Antitrust, Economics and Politics, 1 ANrTIRUsr BUL. 225 (1955) ; Comment, 66 YALE
L.J. 69 (1956).
39. An inefficient patentee who can fully exploit by licensing would not be tempted
to invest his resources in a field for which he is unsuited. The production would be
handled by the most efficient producers, hence effected at the lowest possible cost and the
least expenditure of resources. See BAIN, PRIcE TH EORY 152-59 (1952) ; note 40 infra.
If encouraged to prefer self-production, a final-good patentee with insufficient capacity
to produce at the optimum level would supply consumers with less of his product at a
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Any agreement resulting in price restraint should, of course, be viewed
with suspicion. Like price control in the broader commercial marketplace,
patent-licensing restrictions negate price competition and its attendant bene-
fits. 40 Therefore, a general policy voiding price or quantity licensing limitations
could effectively advance the values of antitrust legislation. But the total con-
cept of the patent monopoly impinges upon generalized antitrust philosophy.
4 '
To encourage invention, Congress has specifically established a temporary mo-
nopoly protecting the patented disclosure.42 Within that context, licensing
higher price than that which would maximize his returns. This follows from the necessary
relationship between price and output. See note 22 supra. With intermediate patents,
insufficient production may not bring higher prices since maximum price is set by the
price of the replaced product or process. However, the economy suffers to the extent
that less efficient products or methods are used instead of the patented good. The object
of any economic system is to produce a given output with the lowest possible outlay of
resources. BAIN, PRIcE THEORY 152-59 (1952) ; PETERSON, ECoNomics 30-34 (1949).
40. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 317-20 (1948) (concurring
opinion); ATr'y GEN. REP. 235-36 (dissent of Louis B. Schwartz).
Price is the directing force in a system of free enterprise for allocating resources and
determining distributive shares of the total product. Theoretically, if prices are permitted
to find their natural level, scarce resources will be optimally allocated-consumers will
receive those goods that will maximize satisfactions, produced by the most efficient means.
If these goals are to be reached or approximated, prices must be free to move in response
to market forces and not be impeded by restrictions in the form of collusive agreements.
BAIN, PRICE THEORY 152-72 (1952).
Simultaneously, price competition protects the consumer from extortion by sellers
charging prices significantly above costs. Each producer is forced to keep price low
and quality high for fear of losing business to others who will undercut him. Invention
is stimulated by the fear of a competitor lowering his costs, and subsequently his selling
price. Inefficient producers unable to compete pricewise with their lower cost rivals are
eliminated. WILcox, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AmERIcAN INDUSTRY (TNEC Mono-
graph No. 21, 1940). See also STOCKING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE
C. 1 (1951).
But price competition is not without drawbacks. Unruly markets may result in cut-
throat competition and predatory price policies. Moreover, in periods of economic re-
cession, highly flexible prices may accentuate the decline if businessmen cut prices in
efforts to capture part of the dwindling demand. Finally, it has been argued that some
abatement of price competition, leading to the possibility of monopoly profits, is necessary
to induce entrepreneurs to take the great risks involved in developing and marketing
large-scale innovations in product or technique. SCHUMPETER, CAPiTALISm, SOCIALISM
AND D iocRAcy 81-107 (3d ed. 1950).
41. See EDWARDs, MAINTAINING CoMPEniON 216-35 (1949) (patent may be used
to increase the concentration of power and further monopolistic abuses); Levine, The
Shrunken Patent Domain in the Expanded Anti-trust Universe, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 436
(1952) (any patent-induced restriction of competition will be held an antitrust violation) ;
Petro, Patents: Tudicial Developments and Legislative Proposals, 12 U. CHI. L. REV. 80,
352 (1944) (patents are the source of monopolistic abuses). Contra, Schramm, Relation-
ship of the Patent Act of 1952 to the Antitrust Laws, 23 GEo. WASH. L. RMv. 36 (1954)
(no conflict between ownership of a patent and the antitrust laws) ; Diggins, The Patent-
Antitrust Problem, 53 Mica. L. REv. 1093 (1955) (each has a well-defined scope).
42. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1952). Patents are specifically provided for in the Constitution.
See note 35 supra.
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restrictions do foster competitive goals by promoting widespread licensing.
Whether or not such limitations should be a part of the patent reward is a
problem long debated and unresolved.43 Congress has in part legislated an
answer. It has expressly authorized territorial limitations and impliedly con-
doned the long-standing practice of price restrictions.44 Narrow revision of
this policy through such mechanisms as the single-licensee doctrine is un-
satisfactory. Broad revision, requiring delicate adjustment of the patent law
grant and antitrust rejection of monopoly power, might better lie with the
Congress than the courts.
43. Numerous unsuccessful attempts have been made to amend the patent laws to
prohibit price fixing in licenses. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 303
n.18 (1948) ; dissenting opinion of Burton, J., id. at 362-63.
44. See Lutz, Are the Courts Carrying Out Constitutional Public Policy on Patents?,
34 J. PAT. OFF. Sody 766 (1952) ; Thomas, supra note 5. Contra, ED)WARDS, MAINTAIN-
ING COMPMTITiox 244-48 (1949) ; Meyers & Lewis, The Patent "Franchise" and the Anti-
trust Laws, 30 GEo. L.J. 117, 260, 267-75 (1942) ; Watkins & Stocking, Patent Monopolies
and Free Enterprise, 3 VAN. L. R.wv. 729 (1950).
